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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Wagstaff's case is distinguishable from the cases cited by 
respondent, which involved multiple use of a proven controlled 
substance. The Board suggests a departure from the Rules of 
Evidence not supported by the law and which would work a serious 
injustice to petitioner. 
ARGUMENT 
The respondent Board of Review (the "Board") begins its 
argument in Point I by attempting to distinguish this case from 
Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Dept. of Empl. Security. 11A P.2d 330 
(Ut. App. 1987). It notes that in Champlin the court found the 
employee did not violate his company's policy "by reporting to work 
under the influence of marijuana or by using it while on the job." 
Id.. at 332. The Board then contrasts Champlin with this case by 
asserting that Wagstaff did violate his employer's policy. 
However, the Board fails to identify any evidence showing that 
Wagstaff was ever under the influence of a controlled substance. 
As was pointed out repeatedly in Wagstaff's opening brief, the 
substance involved in his one-time experiment was never established 
to be cocaine or any other controlled substance. No evidence was 
offered that consumption of the substance produced any of the 
effects ordinarily associated with consumption of a drug. Wagstaff 
reported no "high" nor is there any evidence that he was forced to 
leave work or that his performance was affected throughout the 
remainder of the day. In contrast, it is without dispute in 
Champlin that the employee smoked marijuana twice a week after 
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finishing his work shift. According to testimony accepted by the 
Board of Review in another case that it cites, Johnson v. Dept. of 
Enrol. Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Ut. App. 1989), marijuana remains in 
the human system for weeks after its initial intake. Therefore, 
the claimant in Champlin was arguably more influenced by his 
consumption of a controlled substance than Wagstaff ever was. 
The Board also relies on Department of the Air Force v. 
Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 1361 (Ut. App. 
1990)(Butler) and submits that had the employer established its 
policy regarding off-base involvement in illegal drugs, "the Board 
of Review would have denied benefits to Butler and this court would 
have affirmed that denial." Respondent's Brief, at 8. Ignored by 
the respondent is the analysis in Butler wherein the court 
identified two defects in Air Force's case: 1) a failure to 
identify any policies or standards of conduct that had been 
violated and, 2) a failure to show an adverse effect on the 
employer. Id., at 1366. Arguably, the employee's actions in the 
Butler case were more egregious than those attributed to Wagstaff. 
Butler admitted that he had sold cocaine to an undercover agent, 
was arrested but never prosecuted. Despite this activity, the 
court found no evidence that Butler's acts brought any public 
notoriety or dishonor to Air Force or damage to its efficiency, 
employee morale or discipline. Butler was not discharged to avoid 
potential harm to Air Force. Like Wagstaff, Butler was dismissed 
simply because, according to Air Force, his "conduct violated Air 
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Force standards of conduct and consequently, he should be removed 
from employment." 
Wagstaff acknowledges Air Force's rightful interest in 
removing drug users from its employment; he simply disagrees with 
Air Force's and the Board's conclusion that his one-time 
experimentation with a purported controlled substance classifies 
him as a drug user. Indeed, Air Force in its brief filed in this 
case has gone so far as to say that Wagstaff would never have 
qualified for its drug rehabilitation program, because such 
programs only apply to people with "an extended history of abuse 
who voluntarily seek assistance..." and "Mr. Wagstaff is not such 
a person." Air Force Brief, at 9. It defies rationality to say 
that a repeat drug offender should be able to claim the remedy of 
rehabilitation while an employee with a 12-year, perfect record of 
employment who in a moment of weakness experiments with a 
substance, never proven to be a narcotic, must suffer not only job 
termination but loss of unemployment compensation as well. While 
such a standard may make sense to the Air Force and the Board, 
adoption of such reasoning by this court would establish a 
precedent far removed from that fundamental fairness which is 
inherent in American jurisprudence. The unemployment compensation 
statute is designed to deny benefits to those who intentionally 
bring about their own termination, not to severely punish those who 
make a mistake, repent of it and establish over a seven-month 
period their commitment to not repeating their error. 
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Wagstaffs case also differs significantly from the facts in 
Johnson v. Dept. of Empl. Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Ut. App. 1989). 
It is well established that Johnson was a repeat drug offender. 
Johnson tested positive for marijuana use and was given a three-
day suspension by his employer, Thiokol Corporation. While on a 
12-month probation, a subsequent random test again proved positive 
for marijuana use. In contrast, Wagstaff is charged with having 
consumed a substance that was never tested or in any way proven to 
be a controlled substance. He admitted the incident and 
voluntarily underwent a urinalysis which proved negative. There 
is a significant difference between an employee who twice tests 
positive for use of a controlled substance and one who has never 
been scientifically established to be a drug user. Approval of the 
stringent standard urged by Air Force and the Board would open the 
doors to abuse of employee rights in an area already regulated in 
favor of employers and against employees' individual rights. 
In its second point, the Board suggests to the court that the 
OSI report was not actually hearsay and urges the court to approve 
its admission as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(8) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Again, the Board suggests a 
dangerous precedent and one not supported by the rule itself. 
Leaving aside the question whether OSI could be considered a public 
office or agency, the Board's suggestion evidences a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the purpose of Rule 803(8). 
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The Utah rule, which is based on Federal Rules of Evidence 
803(8), is often described as the "official statements" exception 
to the hearsay rule. As one court observed: 
Actually, this exception is recognized because 
of necessity or the inconvenience which would 
result from always requiring the testimony of 
the official in person to the facts he has 
recorded; and his official duty supports the 
requirement that there be found some 
circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. 
Vanadium Corp. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 
159 F.2d 105, 109 (2nd Cir. 1947) quoting 
Wiamore on Evidence §§630-633 (3rd Ed. 1940) 
and Richardson on Evidence, 2nd Ed, §591. 
The problem with the Board's suggestion is that the OSI report 
is not an "official statement" on the order of the toxicology 
report at issue in Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm.. 691 
P.2d 1244 (Utah 1984). There is a significant difference between 
the report of the state chemist regarding the amount of alcohol 
present in a "VO and Coke" and statements by witnesses who 
themselves are the subject of a criminal investigation, with 
nothing to lose and everything to gain from naming other potential 
offenders. The statements which the Board would have this court 
accept as admissable evidence are not facts or official statements 
but hearsay, not admissable under any exception to the hearsay 
rules. As the court in Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 
126 (2nd Cir. 1935) stated in rejecting certain tax records 
containing hearsay statements: 
The public nature of these cards may vitiate 
hearsay in the transcription, but it cannot 
vitiate hearsay in what is transcribed. The 
fact that a record is public adds nothing to 
what is recorded. 
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The public records exception to the hearsay rule is intended 
to benefit the public official who recorded certain facts, not to 
transform hearsay statements into admissable evidence. Nor was the 
rule designed to promote the convenience of the Air Force by 
relieving it of the "substantial burden and expense of producing 
as witnesses at unemployment insurance hearings the various 
individuals cited in the OSI report..." Respondent's Brief, at 15. 
The Board forgets that the employer has the burden of proving just 
cause in a case of this type. While adoption of the Board's 
suggestion regarding Rule 803(8) might allow it to "more 
efficiently deal with its substantial case load...", it would do 
so at the expense of claimant's constitutional right to due 
process. 
Finally, the Board overlooks an important qualifier in Rule 
803(8): the exception does not apply if "the sources of information 
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." Air 
Force's own witness admitted to a major "typographical error" which 
caused the statement of another employee to be attributed to 
Wagstaff. See Petitioner's Brief, at 5. OSI's inability to 
correctly record information casts serious doubt on the reliability 
of the statements recorded. 
CONCLUSION 
In its brief, the Board agrees with the employer that an 
employee's one-time experimentation with a substance purported to 
be a controlled drug is just cause for disqualifying him from 
unemployment compensation. Wagstaff maintains that such a policy 
6 
is contrary to respondent's own regulations which direct an 
assessment of the degree of culpability and which allow exceptions 
for isolated incidents. The Board goes one step further and urges 
the court to accept as admissable evidence hearsay statements 
contained in the report of an investigation unit of the employer, 
thereby shifting the burden of proof from the employer to the 
employee and making its own job easier. Wagstaff urges the court 
to reject this extreme suggestion and reverse the Board's decision 
as argued in its opening brief. 
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